The Supreme Court’s UAPA judgment raises difficult questions about how long personal liberty can be deferred before a trial even begins.
On 5 January, the Supreme Court decided the fate of several accused in the Delhi riots conspiracy case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Five of them were granted bail. Two were not: Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam.
Both have spent about five years in custody, and the trial is yet to begin.
The Court did not rule on their guilt. It did not examine the evidence in detail. Instead, it held that their continued incarceration has not yet crossed the threshold of what it described as “constitutional impermissibility”.
In other words, the Court concluded that the length of time already spent in custody, by itself, was still not sufficient to justify release on bail under the UAPA framework.
This conclusion is significant because it clarifies how courts are expected to evaluate prolonged incarceration when bail is sought under special security laws.
When jail precedes trial
Under ordinary criminal law, bail is generally the rule and jail the exception. A person is usually released while the trial proceeds, unless there is a real risk of flight or interference with justice.
Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are not being tried under ordinary law. They are charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, a statute that creates a distinct and more restrictive framework for bail.
Under UAPA, courts may deny bail where the prosecution places material which, at a preliminary stage, discloses reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true. This does not require the prosecution to prove guilt, but only to show that the allegations cannot be dismissed at this stage. It requires the court to assess whether the allegations, taken at face value, fall within the scope of the offence alleged.
This shifts the focus of bail proceedings. Freedom does not turn on a full assessment of evidence at this stage, but on whether the statutory threshold set by Parliament continues to apply.
Why some accused were released and others were not
In its judgment, the Supreme Court made a clear distinction between the accused.
Some were described as having played a facilitatory or supporting role. Others, including Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, were held—on the basis of the prosecution material—to occupy a more “central and formative” position in the alleged conspiracy, involving planning, coordination, and mobilisation.
On this basis, the Court granted bail to five accused while holding that the statutory conditions for bail under UAPA continued to apply to Khalid and Imam.
Importantly, these conclusions were reached at the bail stage. The trial has not yet tested the evidence, and the allegations remain to be proved.
When delay is acknowledged, but not decisive
The Court did recognise that prolonged pre-trial incarceration is a serious concern and that personal liberty under Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional framework.
At the same time, it held that delay alone cannot override the bail restrictions imposed by a special statute like UAPA. Liberty, in this reasoning, is not denied outright, but deferred within the boundaries laid down by law.
To prevent detention from continuing indefinitely, the Court allowed Khalid and Imam to seek bail again after the examination of protected witnesses or after one year, whichever is earlier.
Why this matters beyond one case
This judgment is not only about Umar Khalid or Sharjeel Imam. It illustrates how bail operates under special security laws.
Under UAPA, restrictions on liberty can continue for long periods before a trial begins, so long as the statutory conditions are found to be satisfied. The Supreme Court has applied the law as it stands.
In doing so, the ruling is likely to shape how lower courts assess delay and incarceration in future bail hearings under the Act.
But the outcome raises a broader question for a constitutional democracy: when prolonged incarceration is acknowledged as troubling, yet still considered legally permissible, how should society understand the balance between security, procedure, and personal freedom?
That question is not limited to courtrooms alone. It shapes how citizens understand justice, delay, and the cost of waiting under criminal law.
