The Chhattisgarh High Court has said that religious bodies like Sharia courts or Dar ul Qaza have no legal authority or legal status to grant a divorce. In a judgement in a writ petition filed by a Raipur-based Muslim woman, Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad said that any “verdict,” “order,” or fatwa that is issued by extrajudicial religious forums cannot be treated as a substitute for a decree passed by a court of law. It said that they are best suited for a nonbinding opinion.
The judgement comes for a case where a 38-year-old Nirosh Abbasi married Mohammad Abid Khan in 2022 after her first husband died in 2015. However, subsequently, a dispute ignited between the two over the adjustment of the children to their new family. Abbasi said that her husband after that initiated divorce proceedings.
She said that her husband gave her triple talaq on August 31, September 30, and October 30, 2021. Abbasi said that her in-laws harassed and abused her, and counselling also failed to resolve the dispute.
Abbasi had also initiated legal proceedings and lodged an FIR under Section 498-A (cruelty by husband or relatives) and Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code at the women police station, Raipur. Abbasi, meanwhile, accused her husband and in-laws of harassment, cruelty, and abuse. Counselling also failed to resolve the dispute
Subsequently, during the dispute, the Raipur Sharia Court issued an order on January 18, 2020, which declared Abbasi divorced from her husband.
Nirosh Abbasi, the petitioner, challenged an order issued by the Idara-E-Shariya Islami Court in Raipur on January 18, 2022. However, when the matter came to the High Court, Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad declared the Sharia body’s order as void.
The court said that Shariya bodies, which issue fatwas, or religious opinions, are not legally constituted courts, and their views cannot legally change a person’s rights, marriage, or responsibilities. The High Court stopped short of examining whether the divorce itself was constitutionally valid. Instead, it focused on whether the private religious body had the authority to make such a determination, holding that divorce and the legal rights arising from it can only be decided through a competent court or a process recognized by law.
