Abstract
The Islamic world has produced numerous scholars who asserted the need to reinterpret and reapply Islamic principles and ideals to formulate new responses to the challenges of modern life. In South Asia, Allamah Muhammad Iqbal pioneered this field during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His reconciliatory approach to bridging Western and Islamic thought remains particularly significant. This paper employs a descriptive-analytical method to examine Iqbal’s concept of Ijtihad, defined as the reinterpretation of Islamic concepts according to contemporary needs.
Introduction:
Allamah Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) occupies a unique position as a philosopher, devout Muslim, poet, and activist. To different audiences, he represents different qualities: a
progressive modern Muslim, a Westernizer, the intellectual father of Pakistan, and a synthesizer of Islam, mysticism, and modernity comparable to al-Ghazali. In religious thought, while
adhering strictly to Islamic principles, Iqbal contributed significantly to the reconstruction of
Islamic religious thought. His profound knowledge of the Qur’an and Sunnah, combined with his roles as seer, poet, philosopher, and religious thinker, makes his concept of Ijtihad essential for understanding his approach to Islam.
Iqbal’s Views on Ijtihad:
Iqbal stands among the foremost advocates of Ijtihad. His writings frequently examine this theme, identifying the failure to practice Ijtihad as a primary cause of Muslim decline.
Definition and Significance:
Ijtihad is an Arabic term literally meaning utmost physical or mental effort expended in an
activity. Technically, in legal contexts, it denotes the jurist’s thorough exertion of mental faculty to resolve a legal case. Iqbal teaches that Ijtihad constitutes the “principle of movement in the structure of Islam,” urging Muslims to critically evaluate proposed solutions to contemporary problems.
For Iqbal, Ijtihad represents dynamism, mobility, and the creative spirit of Islam. It reconciles permanence and change in life, manifesting spiritual eternity through variety and
transformation. Iqbal defines Ijtihad literally as “to exert” and legally as “to exert with a view to form an independent judgment on a legal question.” He considers Ijtihad and action parallel principles that must operate together, viewing action or movement as the nature of the
universe, human nature, and the foundation of religion’s eternity. Ijtihad serves as a tool for
settling jurisprudential disputes according to prevailing standards. Inspired by this viewpoint, he undertakes detailed examination of the history of the gradual development of Islamic jurisprudence and repeatedly points toward its progressive character.
Qur’anic and Prophetic Foundations:
Iqbal traces Ijtihad’s origin to a well-known Qur’anic verse: “And to those who exert We show Our Path” (29:69). He also cites a tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad appointed Mu’adh as ruler of Yemen. When asked how he would decide matters, Mu’adh replied: “I will judge matters according to the book of Allah.” The Prophet asked “If the Book of Allah contains nothing to guide you?” Mu’adh answered: “Then I will act on the precedents of the Prophet of Allah.” The Prophet further asked: “But if the precedents fail?” Mu’adh responded: “Then I will exert to form my own judgment.” This exertion to form independent judgment constitutes the essence of Ijtihad, though it does not imply independence from the Qur’an and Sunnah, which remain its proper limits.
Iqbal was a great philosopher and poet who minutely studied the holy Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet and tried to explain Ijtihad in the light of Islamic teachings. Regarding it, Iqbal’s views are open-ended. While connoting the term Ijtihad, he says:
“The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life; for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Qur’an, is one of the greatest ‘signs’ of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature. The failure of Europe in political and social science illustrates the former principle; the immobility of Islam during the last 500 years illustrates the latter. What, then, is the principle of movement in the structure of Islam? This is known as ‘Ijtihad’.”
Historical Development of Ijtihad:
Contrary to the common belief that Ijtihad began with the four schools of jurisprudence, learned companions of the Prophet exercised independent judgment from Islam’s earliest days. Several prominent figures among the companions were among the earliest mujtahids, and their decisions never contradicted the Qur’an and Sunnah.
In the second century after Hijrah, four great schools emerged. The first was founded by Imam Abu Hanifah (80-150 AH). The second was founded by Imam Malik (93-179 AH). The third was founded by Imam Shafa’i (150-204 AH). The fourth was founded by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (164-241 AH).
A tragic development in Islamic history was the subsequent closing of the so-called “door of Ijtihad.” Notably, the Shi’i school maintained this tradition throughout the centuries. It is not possible to determine precisely why Ijtihad appeared to decline after the third century AH.
However, it is quite certain that for centuries scholars refused to interpret the law according to their own reason, relying completely on earlier mujtahids. Later, Ibn Taymiyyah (659-725 AH) made great efforts to revive Ijtihad, returning to original sources for every judgment. But after his death, until the middle of the eighteenth century, the Muslims did not produce any special exponent of Ijtihad.
In the middle of the eighteenth century, Shah Wali Allah Dehlvi (1114-1175 AH) attempted to reinstate reason and individual judgment. It is generally regarded that Iqbal was influenced by Shah Waliullah’s movement. It was considered infidelity among Muslims to depart from the confines of the four schools of jurisprudential thought. Iqbal wanted to open the doors and break the circle shut and drawn centuries ago. But Iqbal also emphasizes moderation and attachment to the basic thoughts of Islam as well as loyalty to its foundation.
He stated that the ancient is as imperative an element in the lives of nations as the modern. While the modern is indispensable, apathy to the ancient is uncalled for. In fact, the modern is only an extension of the ancient. He added that if we want to stop the decline and degradation of a nation, we must not regard our past history with undue respect. Its revival should not be done in a self-styled fashion.
Wrong respect for the past and stagnation run contrary to the inner spirit of Islam. As Muslims progressively learn its power, the universal spirit of Islam will continue working despite the jurists’ love for the old.
Intellectual Approach:
Iqbal possessed excellent knowledge of the Qur’an but never professed to be a theologian. He was too rational, and his thinking too poetic and imaginative. His professional and poetic pursuits did not allow him sufficient time to explore the depths of religious disputations that
had occupied Islamic history for centuries. On religious issues, he regularly consulted the learned scholars and sought their advice and guidance. He remained in touch with Syed Sulayman Nadvi (1301-1371 AH), and most of his letters to him consisted of inquiries on religious matters.
Ijtihad as Remedy for Stagnation:
Iqbal views religion as a vitalizing force providing stability and adaptability to society. He sees Ijtihad as the only means to rescue Muslims from global stagnation. The scope of Ijtihad encompasses justice, equity, public opinion, public interest, social usage, and customary behaviour. A mujtahid, possessing sound common sense and knowledge of Islamic law’s fundamentals, can derive relevant information from these areas to reinterpret religious and social matters.
Iqbal emphasized the need for stability and adaptability of Islamic doctrines in modern times. In his Reconstruction, he discussed Ijtihad with considerable expression and originality, specifying it as “the principle of movement in the structure of Islam.” Iqbal points out that the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence recognize three degrees of Ijtihad.
The first is complete authority in legislation, confined practically to founders of schools. The second is relative authority exercised within a particular school’s limits. The third is special authority relating to determining law for specific cases left undefined by founders. Iqbal’s concern focuses on the first degree—complete legislative authority—which Sunnis accept but no individual has exercised since the schools’ establishment. He points out that such an attitude seems exceedingly strange in a system of law based mainly on the groundwork provided by the Qur’an, which embodies an essentially
dynamic outlook on life.
Iqbal holds the opinion that human affairs cannot be conducted by eternally rigid principles.
According to him, there should be certain permanent values, but at the same time there ought to be provision for change, so that life does not stagnate.
One major reason for Muslim decline, in Iqbal’s judgment, was the inability or unwillingness to subject the legal system to intellectual scrutiny, particularly with reference to Ijtihad as an
acknowledged source of Islamic law. He views Ijtihad as the catalyst for Islam’s intellectual resurgence, desiring to reconstruct Islamic law according to modern needs. Only religious obligations, as the rights of God, lie beyond change, while mundane matters, relating to people’s rights, remain subject to modification.
The Turkish Model:
Iqbal observes the modern Turkish Liberal Movement with great interest and anxiety. He welcomes the religio-political thought of Turkey’s Religious Reform party, in contrast to the
Nationalist party’s position on separating religion from politics. While accepting the views of the leader of the Turkish Religious party on Islamic dynamism and universalism, Iqbal remains dissatisfied with their direction of Ijtihad. Nevertheless, he is optimistic about this movement as inspiration for reopening Ijtihad in modern times. Regarding this Turkish experiment, Iqbal concludes: “The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self-consciousness.”
Blind Following and Consensus:
Analyzing Iqbal’s writings leaves no doubt that blind following contradicts religion. Iqbal holds that the finality of the Qur’anic message did not intend that past applications of Islamic basics under different circumstances should bind all future generations. Ijtihad forms an integral part of the principle of movement.
Iqbal also accepted consensus as the most important legal notion in Islam, though it remained practically a mere idea, rarely assuming permanent institutional form in any Islamic country. He argues that the pressure of new world forces and the experience of European nations are impressing upon the modern Islamic mind the value and possibilities of the idea of consensus. Iqbal interpreted and redefined Ijtihad and consensus, suggesting that the right to interpret Islam for the community be transferred from the individual scholars to a national assembly or legislature. This collective or corporate consensus would then constitute the authoritative consensus of the community.
In his own words:
“The transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of classical schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form consensus can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into the affairs.”
This, he considers, is the only way toward new avenues, new opportunities, and new possibilities. Iqbal’s special contribution to the development of Muslim legal thought was the re-establishment of the principle he advocated, namely the enlargement of the scope and
authority of consensus. His view was quickly accepted by the Westernized Muslim intelligentsia in the Sub-Continent and came to be equated with public opinion and parliamentary institutions.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, Iqbal, like other Muslim modernist thinkers, demonstrated determination and strength of mind, genuinely stimulating new thinking on contemporary issues. He proved that Islam is a dynamic religion requiring continuing intellectual review of both normative and historical Islam. Through his passionate poetry, Iqbal enshrined Islam’s progressive spirit for intellectual, moral, and social regeneration in the hearts of millions. He remains, even to this day, a source of inspiration and empowerment for those seeking to create communities and
societies embodying Islam’s highest ideals and best practices.
Iqbal’s special contribution was twofold: re-establishing the right to interpret Islam through Ijtihad as the principle of movement in Islam, and enlarging the scope and authority of consensus. He recommended reinterpreting Islamic principles to guide humanity under changed conditions. For Iqbal, Ijtihad is a tool of modification, a movement toward advancement, and a bridge connecting lasting values with the demands of varying life circumstances.
References: 1) Ahmad, A. (1950). Iqbal and Modern Thought. 2) Iqbal, M. (1934). The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 3) Jafari, S. (2010). Iqbal’s Philosophy of Ijtihad. 4) Parvez, G. A. (1953). Iqbal’s Concept of Ijtihad.
