India’s relationship with Israel did not begin with Narendra Modi, or even with Rahul Gandhi. Its roots go back to Jawaharlal Nehru, whose government recognised Israel in 1950, permitted an Israeli consulate in Bombay, maintained channels of communication with Israeli leaders and accepted Israeli arms during the 1962 war with China. Nehru’s own explanation for recognising the country was direct: India would have done so earlier, he said, “because Israel is a fact”.
The history is relevant again after Rahul Gandhi said on 19 November 2026 that India should maintain strong strategic ties with Israel, including defence cooperation, while continuing to speak out against its actions in Gaza. The Congress leader’s position has drawn criticism from those who believe that maintaining close ties with Israel is incompatible with condemning its conduct in Gaza. But it is not a departure from the approach adopted by the Congress governments that preceded him. Nehru’s policy combined recognition and practical engagement with reservations about Israel’s actions and concern for Arab opinion.
That argument returned to the centre of national politics in February 2026, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed Israel’s Knesset. Modi noted that India had formally recognised Israel on 17 September 1950, his own date of birth, and declared that India stood with Israel “firmly, with full conviction”. The Congress described the address as an “unabashed defence” of Benjamin Netanyahu. Party general secretary Jairam Ramesh responded by recalling Nehru’s 1947 correspondence with Albert Einstein, in which Nehru expressed sympathy for both Jews and Arabs and questioned the prospects of a settlement imposed against the wishes of either side. The exchange brought Nehru’s more qualified approach back into the political debate.
Rahul Gandhi’s position has also drawn criticism from within sections of the Opposition’s support base. Delhi University professor Apoorvanand described his remarks as “deeply disappointing and disturbing”, arguing that maintaining ties with Israel sits uneasily with calls for sanctions over its conduct in Gaza. Gandhi’s comments should also be read alongside his earlier condemnation of Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks and hostage-taking. The record is therefore more complicated than a simple division between support for Israel and support for Palestinians.
The statement that set off the row
Speaking at the University of Chicago on 19 November, Gandhi said India’s foreign policy should be guided by its own interests. He supported a strong relationship with Israel and referred to defence purchases, while arguing that strategic ties should not require India to remain silent about Gaza. In a post on X, he said he condemned both the October 7 attacks and Israel’s actions in Gaza, adding that “one wrong cannot justify another”. The remarks were reported by ANI and published by The Tribune and Outlook.
The reaction has exposed a familiar divide within the political debate: whether a country can maintain strategic relations with Israel while criticising its actions against Palestinians. The historical record suggests that successive Congress governments have answered that question in the affirmative, even as the emphasis and the diplomatic context have changed.
1947–50: Nehru keeps the door open
India’s first votes on the question of Palestine did not support the creation of Israel on the terms proposed at the time. On 29 November 1947, India voted against the United Nations partition plan for Palestine, which was adopted by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions. In 1949, India also voted against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. These positions reflected India’s opposition to the partition plan and its concerns about the consequences for Palestinians and the wider region; they did not prevent the government from later recognising Israel.
Nehru’s government initially held back. In a letter dated 30 January 1949, Nehru wrote that recognising Israel at that stage would be inappropriate and potentially harmful to India’s position in relation to the Indonesian question. In February 1950, he stated that recognition did not mean accepting Israeli policy and that India was withholding recognition out of consideration for Arab opinion. Israel’s existence, however, was increasingly treated as a political reality with which India would have to deal.
On 17 September 1950, India formally recognised Israel. Explaining the decision, Nehru said: “We would have recognised Israel long ago, because Israel is a fact. We refrained because of our desire not to offend the sentiments of our friends in the Arab countries.” The statement captures the tension at the heart of his policy: acceptance of Israel’s statehood alongside an effort to preserve relations with Arab countries.
The recognition was full and formal, not merely symbolic. Nehru later made clear that India would not withdraw it, arguing that doing so would not help resolve the Palestinian question. He also maintained that recognition did not amount to endorsement of Israeli policy.
Nehru’s earlier correspondence with Einstein also reflected this attempt to hold competing claims in view. In a reply dated 11 July 1947, he acknowledged the suffering of Jews and the achievements of Jewish communities in Palestine, while expressing sympathy for Arabs and questioning why Jewish leaders had not secured Arab goodwill. His response did not endorse the partition of Palestine; it conveyed his concern that a settlement lacking the consent of the people affected would perpetuate conflict. Jairam Ramesh cited this exchange after Modi’s Knesset address in February 2026.
The quiet channels
Recognition was followed by a limited but functioning Israeli presence in India. The Jewish Agency first established an immigration office in Bombay, which later became a trade office and then a consulate. The Israeli consulate in Bombay was operating from 1953. India and Israel did not exchange embassies, but contacts continued through officials and diplomatic channels in third countries.
Nehru and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion also maintained correspondence. The relationship was not equivalent to formal diplomatic ties, and India continued to restrict official interaction. But the existence of a consulate and communication between the two prime ministers complicates the claim that Nehru’s government maintained an absolute political distance from Israel.
The contacts continued even as India maintained limits on official engagement. In a note dated 14 June 1963, Nehru recorded that Israel’s consul in Bombay had delivered a letter from Ben-Gurion and discussed ways to improve people-to-people and technical exchanges. Nehru wrote that India should not encourage extensive interaction, but should not obstruct it where cooperation was useful. The note illustrates the calibrated nature of the relationship: neither a full diplomatic partnership nor a complete severance of contact.
1962: Israeli arms during the war with China
The clearest example of practical cooperation came during the 1962 war with China. As the conflict intensified, Israel offered India military assistance. A contemporaneous letter from Indian minister Mahavir Tyagi to Nehru, dated 30 October 1962 and preserved in the Nehru Archive, records that Israel’s trade commissioner had approached him with an offer of weapons, including mortars and Uzi submachine guns.
Accounts based on Israeli archival records also describe the supply of weapons and ammunition to India during the conflict. According to those accounts, India asked that the arms be transported on ships that did not fly the Israeli flag, mindful of the diplomatic sensitivities involved in its relations with Arab countries. Ben-Gurion reportedly refused to conceal the Israeli identity of the shipment, and the arms were delivered on Israeli-flagged ships. This episode should be understood with care: the broad account of Israeli assistance is documented in historical reporting, while some details of the exchange have been reconstructed from Israeli records rather than from a complete Indian government file.
Israel supplied India with munitions again during the 1965 war with Pakistan. These episodes show that, despite the absence of full diplomatic relations, India was prepared to accept Israeli assistance when it considered that assistance necessary for its security.
Why full diplomatic relations had to wait
Nehru nevertheless stopped short of establishing full diplomatic relations. India went along with Israel’s exclusion from the 1955 Bandung Conference, and criticised Israel’s role in the 1956 Suez crisis. Its policy was shaped in part by the importance of relations with Arab countries, which mattered to India for political, economic and strategic reasons. Nehru was also concerned that alienating Arab governments could push them closer to Pakistan.
The distinction is important. Nehru’s government recognised Israel, permitted a consulate and accepted military assistance, but did not open an embassy or publicly align itself with Israeli policy. It sought to maintain a working relationship with Israel without abandoning support for Palestinian rights or its wider engagement with the Arab world.
From Nehru to Rao: a Congress policy in two directions
The Congress governments that followed Nehru continued to combine engagement with Israel and support for Palestinian statehood. India recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 and was among the first countries to recognise the State of Palestine in 1988. The Ministry of External Affairs describes support for the Palestinian cause as an integral part of India’s foreign policy.
In January 1992, the Congress government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic relations with Israel, 42 years after Nehru’s government had recognised the country. The decision opened the way for regular embassies and a more visible bilateral relationship. The embassy that Nehru had chosen not to establish was opened under a government led by his own party.
What this means for today’s debate
The historical record does not support the claim that Congress governments always opposed Israel or refused to deal with it. Nehru’s India recognised the state, allowed an Israeli consulate to operate in Bombay, maintained contacts with Israeli leaders and accepted Israeli arms during a national security crisis. At the same time, it opposed the 1947 partition plan, backed Palestinian political rights and avoided full diplomatic relations for decades.
Rahul Gandhi’s position in November 2026 — support for a strong relationship with Israel and defence cooperation, alongside criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza — echoes one strand of that history. It is not identical to Nehru’s policy, which emerged from a different regional and international context. But the underlying distinction between recognising a state, maintaining strategic relations with it and endorsing its government’s actions was present in Nehru’s approach.
That history does not settle the current moral or political debate over Gaza. Nor does it mean that criticism of Gandhi’s remarks is misplaced. It does, however, show that the Congress’s relationship with Israel has never been a simple story of opposition. Nehru set the precedent for a policy that sought to balance strategic interests, relations with Arab countries and support for Palestinian rights. Rahul Gandhi’s remarks belong to that longer, more complicated history.


